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PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN THE BOUNDARYLESS
WORKPLACE: THE TENSION BETWEEN DUE
PROCESS AND PUBLIC POLICY
Katherine VW Stone*
INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, there has been an enormous increase in the
use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in the workplace. Today,
most large corporations have some system of ADR in place, be it a
formal grievance procedure, an ombudsman, an open door policy, or
a complaint hotline. One particularly controversial form of ADR is
the use of arbitration in the nonunion setting.
Prior to 1991, the use of arbitration by nonunion firms to decide
employment disputes was extremely rare. In 1991, the Supreme
Court held in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. that an individual
could be compelled to submit his age discrimination complaint to ar-
bitration.' In the wake Gilmer, the use of arbitration and other types
of ADR in the workplace proliferated. In 1995, the Government Ac-
counting Office found that almost ten percent of nonunion firms uti-
lized arbitration for discrimination claims, and another 8.4% were
considering doing So. 2 The evidence suggests that, by the late 1990s,
even more firms had introduced arbitration systems for their nonun-
ion workforces. In 2001, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Su-
© 2004 Katherine V.W. Stone.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law. This
Article was a presentation at the joint program of the Section on Civil Procedure and
the Section on Alternative Dispute Resolution at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools. It draws on ideas presented in KATHERINE V.W.
STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING
WORKPLACE (2004) (portions reprinted with permission).
1 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that compulsory arbitration of claims under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act was consistent with the Act's statutory frame-
work and purpose).
2 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-95-150, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION:
MOST PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION app. II at 28
(1995).
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preme Court removed whatever doubts persisted about the
application of the Federal Arbitration Act to such employment arbi-
tration systems.3 As a result, employers now have wide latitude to de-
sign alternative mechanisms to avoid costly and risky employment
litigation.
At present, nearly as many workers are covered by nonunion arbi-
tration systems as are covered by union contracts. 4 In addition to arbi-
tration, the use of workplace mediation, peer review, open door
policies, ombudsmen, and management appeal boards have been
growing rapidly. Thus, it appears that ADR has surpassed unions as
the enforcer of fairness in the workplace. This piece explores the rea-
sons for the rapid growth of workplace ADR and asks whether ADR
can effectively realize the promise of fairness at work.
One common explanation for the growth of ADR in the work-
place is that it is a form of union-substitution used to keep unions out.
There is indeed evidence that, in the 1970s and 1980s, some compa-
nies instituted grievance procedures, open door policies, and peer re-
view in order to avoid unionization. 5 However, the precipitous
decline of unions by the end of the 1980s made these kinds of elabo-
rate union avoidance schemes unnecessary. Today workplace ADR
plays two different roles in the workplace, both of which are a conse-
quence of the changing nature of work. Below I describe the new
workplace in order to show how it has given rise to a surge in interest
in workplace-specific dispute resolution. I then describe two settings
where ADR mechanisms are widely used and argue that each requires
a different model of dispute resolution-a procedural justice model
for fairness disputes and a public policy model for discrimination dis-
putes. I suggest that the two models are in tension with each other,
and conclude with speculation about whether the new interest in
workplace dispute resolution can in fact satisfy the disparate goals it
sets for itself.
3 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act applies to all
non-transportation employment contracts).
4 See Katherine V.W. Stone, Employment Arbitration Under the Federal Arbitration Act,
in EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND WORKER RIGHTS IN THE CHANGING WORK-
PLACE 27, 27-28 (Adrienne E. Eaton & Jeffrey H. Keefe eds., 1999) [hereinafter EM-
PLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION].
5 See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Institutional Pressures, Human Resource Strategies, and
the Rise of Nonunion Dispute Resolution Procedures, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 375
(2003).
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I. THE NEW EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
The U.S. workplace has undergone a dramatic change in the past
decade. The long-standing assumption of long-term attachment be-
tween an employee and a single firm has broken down and a new
form of transitory employment relationship has taken its place. No
longer is employment centered on a single, primary employer
throughout one's career. Instead, employees now expect to change
jobs frequently. No longer do employees derive their identity from a
formal employment relationship with a single firm; rather, their em-
ployment identity comes from attachment to an occupation, a skills
cluster, or an industry. At the same time, firms now expect a regular
amount of churning in their workforces. They encourage employees
to look upon their jobs differently, to manage their own careers, and
not to expect long-term job security.
6
This new employment relationship is a vast departure from em-
ployment relationships in the past. Roughly one hundred years ago,
the employment relationship underwent a transformation that per-
sisted throughout most of the twentieth century. On the basis of the
scientific management theories of Frederick Winslow Taylor and
those in the personnel management movement, most large corpora-
tions organized their workforces into job structures that are termed
"internal labor markets." In internal labor markets, jobs are broken
down into minute tasks and then are arranged into hierarchical lad-
ders in which each job provides the training for the job on the next
rung up. Employers who utilized internal labor markets hired only at
the entry level, then utilized internal promotion to fill all of the
higher rungs.
7
Taylorism became the dominant type of human resource policy
within large U.S. manufacturing firms throughout most of the twenti-
eth century.8 Throughout corporate America, management reduced
6 I describe the nature of the changing workplace in KATHERINE V.W. STONE,
FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE
(2004).
7 See PETER B. DOERINGER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND
MANPOWER ANALYSIS 1-90 (1971); Paul Osterman, Introduction to INTERNAL LABOR
MARKETS 1, 2 (Paul Osterman ed., 1984); Katherine Stone, The Origins ofJob Structures
in the Steel Industry, in CONFERENCE ON LABOR MARKET SEGMENTATION, LABOR MARKET
SEGMENTATION 29, 45-49 (Richard C. Edwards et al. eds., 1975); see also CLAUDIA GOL-
DIN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER GAP: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN WOMEN
247 n.38 (1990) (reviewing the economic literature on internal labor market
institutions).
8 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Policing Employment Contracts Within the Nexus-of-
Contracts Firm, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 353, 363-69 (1993).
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the skill level of jobs-a process termed "deskilling"-while at the
same time encouraging employee-firm attachment through promo-
tion and retention policies, explicit or de facto seniority arrange-
ments, elaborate welfare schemes, and longevity-linked benefit
packages. 9 Because employers wanted employees to stay a long time,
they gave them implicit promises of long-term employment and of or-
derly and predictable patterns of promotion. These were the domi-
nantjob structures of the industrial era. While these systems had their
origins in the blue collar workplace of the smokestack industrial heart-
land, by the 1960s they were adapted to large white collar workplaces
such as insurance companies and banks. 10
Sometime in the 1970s, employment practices began to change.
Since then, there have been widespread reports that large corpora-
tions no longer offer their employees implicit contracts for lifetime
employment. Work has become contingent in the sense that the at-
tachment between the firm and the worker has been weakened. The
"recasualization of work" has reportedly become a fact of life both for
blue collar workers and for high-end professionals and managers.11
As employers dismantle their internal labor market job struc-
tures, they are creating new types of employment relationships that
give them flexibility to cross-utilize employees and to make quick ad-
justments in production methods as they confront increasingly com-
petitive product markets. They want to be able to decrease or
redeploy their work forces quickly as product market opportunities
shift. The new employment relationship is what management theo-
rists and industrial relations specialists call the "new psychological
contract," or the "new deal at work." 12 In the new deal, firms disavow
any long-term employment relationship. However, they also believe
they cannot succeed if employees simply perform their tasks in a relia-
ble but routine manner. Firms do not merely need predictable and
excellent role performance, they need "spontaneous and innovative
9 See STONE, supra note 6, at 27-48.
10 HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL 305-12 (1975).
11 See, e.g., The Future of Work: Career Evolution, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2000, at 89; see
also PETER F. DRUCKER, MANAGING IN A TIME OF GREAT CHANGE (1995); ROSABETH
Moss KANTER, ROSABETH Moss KANTER ON THE FRONTIERS OF MANAGEMENT 190-91
(1997); RICHARD SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER 23 (1998).
12 See PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK: MANAGING THE MARKET-DRIVEN
WORK FORCE 217 (1999); Sandra L. Robinson & Denise M. Rousseau, Violating the
Psychological Contract: Not the Exception but the Norm, 15J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 245
(1994); Denise M. Rousseau, The 'Problem' of the Psychological Contract Considered, 19 J.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 665 (1998).
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activity that goes beyond role requirements."' 3 They need employees
to commit their imagination, energies, and intelligence on behalf of
their firms. They want employees to innovate, to pitch in, to have an
entrepreneurial attitude toward their jobs, to behave like owners.
Thus, they want to elicit behavior that goes beyond specific roles and
job demands, and gives the firm something extra. Organizational the-
orists characterize this something extra as organizational citizenship
behavior, or "OCB."'14 Organizational citizenship behavior is defined
as behavior that goes beyond the requirements of specific role defini-
tions. 1 5 Much of current human resource policy is designed to en-
courage that type of behavior.
Managers have been devising new organizational structures that
embody flexibility, promote skill development, and foster OCB. How-
ever, they want to elicit OCB without giving promises of job security
and creating the kind of career-long expectations they generated in
the past. That is, the goal of today's management is, in the words of
one management consultant, to foster "commitment without
loyalty." 16
A new employment relationship is emerging through numerous
experimental programs by organizational theorists and management
practitioners. Despite differences in emphasis, the approaches share
several common features. One is that employers explicitly or implic-
itly promise to give employees employability rather than job security.
They promise to provide learning opportunities that enable employ-
ees to develop their human capital but do not promise long-term em-
ployment. Thus, employers no longer promise to, nor are they are
expected to, keep employees on the payroll when demand for the
product fluctuates downward. Rather, in the new employment rela-
tionship, the risk of the firm's short-term and long-term success is
placed squarely on the employee.
The new employment relationship also involves compensation
systems that peg salaries and wages to market rates rather than inter-
nal institutional factors. The emphasis is on offering employees dif-
ferential pay to reflect differential talents and contributions. Thus,
for example, the leading management consulting firm, Towers Perrin,
urges its clients to "recognize top performers to the greatest extent
possible [by] providing the lion's share of available rewards to the
13 John R. Deckop et al., Getting More Than You Pay For: Organizational Citizenship
Behavior and Pay-for-PeIformance Plans, 42 AcAD. MGMT. J. 420, 420 (1999).
14 See DENNIS W. ORGAN, ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOR: THE GOOD SOL-
DIER SYNDROME (1998).
15 Id. at 4-5.
16 CAPPELLI, supra note 12, at 217.
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highest contributors."' 7 The new employment relationship also in-
volves providing networking opportunities so that employees can raise
their social capital by interacting with a firm's customers, suppliers,
and even competitors. It also is characterized by a flattening of hierar-
chy and the elimination of status-linked perks. And it is associated
with the use of company-specific grievance mechanisms.
II. THE SEARCH FOR PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE
A. New Risks and Vulnerabilities of the New Employment Relationship
The new employment relationship shifts onto employees many
risks that were previously borne by the firm. Foremost, employees
now face a constant risk of job loss due to the continual workforce
churning that characterizes the new workplace. In addition, the new
employment relationship generates a level of wage inequality and
wage uncertainty that was not feasible under the old internal labor
market arrangements. In internal labor markets, wages were set by
institutional factors such as seniority and longevity.18 Wages today, on
the other hand, are increasingly pegged to other individualized fac-
tors and are sensitive to market fluctuations. One result is wage un-
certainty for employees. Gone are the days of reliable and steadily
progressing pay levels along some pre-arranged or pre-agreed-upon
scale. Another result is increasing wage dispersion. Pay rates for simi-
larly-situated employees in different firms and even with a single firm
have become markedly dispersed.
In addition to job insecurity and wage uncertainty, the new em-
ployment practices place on employees the risk of losing the value of
their labor market skills. When jobs are redesigned to provide greater
flexibility, their skill requirements often increase. 19 Newly-trained em-
ployees thus have an advantage over older ones, and on-going training
becomes not an opportunity for advancement but a necessity for sur-
vival. The new employment practices thus impose not only risks ofjob
loss on employees, but also risks of depreciation of one's own skill
base. Rather than being able to count on a rising wage level and a
17 Chris Hatch & Claudine Kapel, Talent Management Remains Critical Even in the
Face of Economic Turbulence, PERSP. ON PEOPLE: PERFORMANCE & REWARDS (Towers Per-
rin), May 2002, available at www.towersperrin.com/hrservices/webcache/towers/Ca-
nada/publications/Periodicals/perspectivePerfRewards/2002_05/pprtalent.pdf.
18 See Stone, supra note 6, at 51-56.
19 For a series of case studies that support this conclusion, see Harry C. Katz,
Industry Studies of Wage Inequality: Symposium Introduction, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
399 (2001).
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comfortable retirement, many workers are anticipating a lifetime of
retooling just to stay in place.
Another type of risk that is generated by the new employment
relationship involves the dissolution of stable and reliable employee
old age and social welfare benefits. In the United States, workers ob-
tain health insurance, pensions, disability, long-term care, and most
other forms of social insurance from their employers-when they can
get it-rather than from the state. Because social insurance is tied to
employment, even if there were no changes in employer benefit poli-
cies or practices, the new employment relationship would erode the
social safety net. As job security wanes, and more and more people
move from job to job, they usually lose whatever employer-sponsored
benefits they once had. Furthermore, employers have been restruc-
turing their plans so as to shift more risk of uncertainty onto employ-
ees. This is most evident in the area of pensions. In the past, almost
all private pensions were "defined benefit" plans. In a defined benefit
plan, employers contribute to a fund on behalf of its covered employ-
ees, and each employee is guaranteed a specified benefit level at the
time of retirement. Since the 1980s, many employers have shifted
from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans, so that to-
day, defined contribution plans have overtaken defined benefit plans
as the dominant form of employer-provided pension in the United
States. 20 In defined contribution plans, the employer contributes a
fixed amount into an account for each worker based on the number
of person-hours worked. In some cases, the worker makes a contribu-
tion as well. Upon retirement, the amount of the worker's pension is
determined by the value of that account at that time. If the funds
were invested well, or if the market did well overall, the worker's pen-
sion could be high. But if they were invested poorly, or if retirement
occurred amidst a market downturn, the pension could be paltry.
The risk, both of the market and of bad decisions, falls on the individ-
ual employee.
B. Procedural Justice to Cushion Risks of the New
Employment Relationship
Because so many risks now fall upon employees, employees may
be unwilling to assume these risks unless they have assurances that the
system is fundamentally fair. While employees no longer expect long-
term employment, they want to ensure that wage assessments are
done fairly, that they are not terminated unfairly, and that they are
20 See STONE, supra note 6, at 252-55.
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given the training opportunities, benefit packages, and other job inci-
dents that they have been promised. They also want to obtain the
networking opportunities that spell career advancement. Without a
perception of fairness and implicit reciprocity, there is a danger that
employees will not give the extra effort that constitutes citizenship be-
havior. Thus, employees' subjective appraisal of their employers' fair-
ness is seen as an important factor in generating OCB. Researchers
have found that employees who perceive their employer as unfair re-
duce their OCB, triggering a downward cycle in which the employee's
diminished OCB leads the supervisor to withdraw informal types of
affirmation, causing the employee to experience additional feelings of
unfairness and to further decrease her OCB.2 1 Hence organizational
theorists advocate that employers establish a system for providing on-
the-job fairness as a means of fostering OCB.
22
Concern for generating OCB has led theorists to focus on the
role of procedural justice and employee perceptions of fairness. 23 Or-
ganizational psychologist Dennis Organ explains that people in orga-
nizations perceive themselves as involved in a social exchange
relationship, in which they contribute effort and citizenship in return
for formal and informal rewards. When they encounter what they
perceive to be unfair treatment, they revise their assessment of the
nature of the overall exchange, retreat from an assumption of reci-
procity, and reinterpret the relationship as an economic transaction.
24
A number of organizational behavioral theorists have proposed
definitions of procedural fairness. One widely-used measure of proce-
dural fairness proposed by G.S. Leventhal utilizes six criteria. To be
fair, according to Leventhal, a procedure must:
(a) be consistently applied;
21 See Dennis W. Organ & Mary Konovsky, Cognitive Versus Affective Determinants of
Organizational Citizenship Behavior, 74J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 157, 162 (1989); see also San-
dra L. Robinson et al., Changing Objectives and the Psychological Contract: A Longitudinal
Study, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 137, 149 (1994) (finding that citizenship may result from
employees' perceptions of the company's performance of its obligations under the
psychological contract).
22 SeeJerald Greenberg, THE QUEST FORJUSTICE ON THEJOB 32-39 (1996). See
generally Jason A. Colquitt et al., Justice at the Millenium: A Meta-Analytic Review of 25
Years of Organizational Justice Research, 86J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 425, 435-37 (2001) (ana-
lyzing various empirical studies and different concepts of justice).
23 See GREENBERG, supra note 22, at 32-39 (1996). See generally Colquitt et. al.,
supra note 22, at 435-36 (analyzing various empirical studies and different concepts
of justice).
24 Dennis W. Organ, The Motivational Basis of Organizational Citizenship Behavior, in
12 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 43, 63-66 (Barry M. Staw & L.L. Cum-
mings eds., 1990).
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(b) be free from bias;
(c) ensure that accurate information is collected and used in the
decision-making process;
(d) have a mechanism to correct flawed decisions;
(e) conform to personal or prevailing standards of ethics;
(f) ensure that the opinions of various affected groups have been
taken into account.
25
All of these criteria are about the process by which rules are ap-
plied and disputes are resolved; they are not about substantive
outcomes.
There is evidence that as firms disavow promises of job security,
procedural fairness becomes more important than ever. For example,
a study of 3000 employees by the Towers Perrin consulting firm in
1997 found that the changes in the employment relationship had
made employees more sensitive to whether they were treated with fair-
ness and respect. 26 It is understandable that employees would focus
on procedural fairness when they lack promises of long-term employ-
ment because in this new employment relationship, employees are re-
quired to bear many of the risks that were previously borne by the
firm. Because employees increasingly have to bear the consequences
of firm failure or market fluctuations, they at least want to be confi-
dent that the incidence of the risks are fairly applied.
Because organizational performance is linked to procedural jus-
tice, employers have attempted to devise procedures for hearing com-
plaints and resolving disputes that foster a perception of fair
treatment. These procedures are a far cry from the management
methods of the nineteenth century, when Andrew Carnegie famously
said: "When a workman raises his head, hit it." Today employers have
instituted a wide range of dispute resolution procedures designed to
address employee complaints.
2 7
For example, some corporations maintain open door policies
that encourage an employee to bring a problem or grievance to a
25 See Colquitt et al., supra note 22, at 426 (citing Gerald S. Leventhal, What
Should Be Done With Equity Theory? New Approaches to the Study of Fairness in Social Rela-
tionships, in SOCIAL EXCHANGE: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 27 (Kenneth J.
Gergen et al. eds., 1980); Gerald S. Leventhal et al., Beyond Fairness: A Theory of Alloca-
tion Preferences, inJUSTICE AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 167 (Gerold Mikula ed., 1980)).
26 Mark V. Roehling et al., The Nature of the New Employment Relationship: A Content
Analysis of the Practitioner and Academic Literatures, 39 HuM. RESOURCES MGMT. 305, 315
(2000).
27 See Lisa B. Bingham & Denise R. Chachere, Dispute Resolution in Employment:
The Need for Research, in EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 4, at 95, 103-13
(discussing the growth of ombudsmen, mediation, and arbitration programs amongst
nonunion firms); Colvin, supra note 5.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
high-level manager outside the chain of command. Some have hired
specialized corporate officers, called ombudsmen, whose job it is to
hear complaints, conflicts, and disputes, and to reach across status
and departmental lines to seek resolution. Some have established
management appeals boards to permit an employee to appeal an ob-
jectionable decision of an immediate supervisor to managers in other
departments or divisions. Peer review procedures, in which disputes
are resolved by panels comprised of fellow employees who hear and
decide specific employee grievances, are also becoming a common
practice. 28 A recent survey of over 300 firms in the telecommunica-
tions industry found peer review procedures in place in 15.9% of the
firms in the sample, a surprisingly high incidence.
2 9
A common characteristic of these employer-initiated dispute reso-
lution techniques is that they all utilize decisionmakers who are from
the firm but outside the employees' normal chain of command. The
peer review plan at aerospace and automobile parts manufacturer
TRW illustrates how these new systems are designed to promote pro-
cedural justice without reinforcing hierarchy. At TRW, peer review
can be invoked by any employee who wants to challenge a supervisory
disciplinary measure, including termination. The review panel con-
sists of five regular peer employees, three selected by the employee
and two by management. 30 The panel holds a hearing, accepts evi-
dence, and then issues a decision. It has no authority to change com-
pany policy, merely to ensure that it was applied correctly. If it was
not, the disciplinary measure is revoked.
31
The purpose of these new nonunion employee dispute resolution
procedures is to create a perception of procedural fairness that will
enable the employee to assume the risk of the employment relation-
ship while augmenting rather than diminishing citizenship behavior.
The goal is not to approximate justice. Thus, for example, Professor
Alex Colvin found that in one TRW plant between 1992 and 1997, 160
employees took cases to peer review, but only ten were successful in
overturning a supervisory decision. The low employee win rate none-
28 See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION (2000).
29 See Colvin, supra note 5, at 382, 386.
30 See Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Relationship Between Arbitration and Workplace Dis-
pute Resolution Procedures, 16 OHIo ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 643, 652 (2001).
31 See id. at 658.
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theless was sufficient to promote a sense of procedural fairness by the
firm.32
C. Assessing the Due Process Model of Dispute Resolution
Because workplace-centered due process forms of dispute resolu-
tion do not ensure substantively "fair" outcomes, one might ask: Are
they just a sham or do they contribute important values to the work-
place? This is a highly controversial question, the answer to which, in
large part, depends upon what one is comparing them to. Compared
to Andrew Carnegie's personnel practices, the newly minted forms of
due process at work seem like a vast improvement because they give
employees some voice about working conditions and enable them to
get redress for the most egregious forms of mistreatment. But com-
pared to the grievance systems in U.S. unions or German-style works
councils, they look minimal at best. And because they neither foster
nor reflect collective empowerment, they are not a substitute for un-
ions. They are creatures of the new employment relationship that
must be understood as part of a larger vision of a non-hierarchical
workplace with committed yet non-attached employees.
One important aspect of these procedural justice types of work-
place ADR is that they draw their substantive norms from the work-
place itself. When an open door policy or a management appeal
board is utilized, the decisionmaker is expected to apply the work-
place's own internal code of conduct, both the formal and informal
rules. Even peer review panels are generally restricted in their powers
and forbidden to disregard the rules of the workplace. 33 Thus, while
the decisionmaker may not always uphold a managerial decision, a
procedural justice style of workplace ADR will reinforce the prevailing
workplace culture. Its function is to instantiate and effectuate the
workplace's internal norms.
III. THIRD PARTfy FoRMs Or DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
THE WORKPLACE
In addition to the proliferation of forms of ADR that rely on
workplace participants, there has also been an increase in forms of
ADR that utilize outside neutrals, i.e., mediation and arbitration. Me-
diation is a method by which an outside neutral helps parties achieve
a consensual resolution of a dispute. Arbitration is a system by which
32 See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Citizens and Citadels: Dispute Resolution and the
Governance of Employment Relations 189, 213 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D disserta-
tion, Cornell University) (on file with author).
33 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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an outside neutral hears evidence and imposes a resolution on the
parties. Both mediation and arbitration involve the injection of out-
siders into the workplace culture. Despite its use of outsiders, how-
ever, mediation shares one goal with peer review and open door
policies-to resolve conflict using the internal perspectives of the par-
ticipants as its normative guiding light. Indeed, the current view of
best mediator practice is that mediators should not impose their own
views of the best resolution of a dispute, but rather facilitate the par-
ties' resolution according to their own normative sense of fairness.
Arbitration, in contrast, brings an external perspective to bear on a
dispute. Such an outside perspective is necessary to address some
types of workplace disputes, particularly those that involve employ-
ment discrimination. For reasons that will be explained below, ADR
that simply instantiates the workplace's own internal norms cannot
adequately address discrimination in the new workplace.
A. New Types of Discrimination Claims
In the past, much employment discrimination was rooted in the
hierarchical job structures of internal labor markets. Today's work-
place does not have as much formal hierarchy, so there are less formal
impediments to advancement. At the same time, because there are
not defined job ladders and the criteria for advancement are not
clearly specified, it is difficult for someone to claim that she has been
bypassed for advancement because of her gender or race. That is, the
diffuse authority structure of the new psychological contract makes
discrimination hard to identify and difficult to challenge.
In addition to the hidden nature of the decisionmaking process,
the decentralization of authority and the flattening of hierarchy mean
that decisions are delegated to a wide range of people who are permit-
ted to use their individual, often idiosyncratic, discretion. Also, when
jobs are defined in terms of competencies and employees are valued
for their varied skills and flexibility, it is difficult for firms to articulate
clear criteria for advancement. Often "social credentials" are used in
lieu of objective performance measures.34 These social credentials in-
clude such assets as prestigious education, membership in social clubs,
participation in certain sports-all activities that have traditionally ex-
cluded women and minorities. Thus, under a system that rewards "so-
cial credentials," women and minorities are disadvantaged.
3 5
34 See Edward S. Adams, Using Evaluations to Break Down the Male Corporate Hierar-
chy: A Full Circle Approach, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 117, 167-68 (2002).
35 See id.
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A growing number of employment discrimination class action
lawsuits allege that informal and decentralized promotion practices
foster covert discrimination against women and minorities. For exam-
ple, in a suit filed in 2001 against Johnson & Johnson, the plaintiffs
alleged that the giant conglomerate knowingly engaged in racial dis-
crimination by maintaining promotion policies that allowed supervi-
sors to "'handpick white candidates, resulting in fewer promotions for
African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans and perpetuating a "glass
ceiling" and "glass walls," thereby blocking advancement of these em-
ployees into "visible and influential roles" within the organization.' "36
Similar complaints against informal promotion policies are becoming
widespread.
In addition, the new nonhierarchical workplace makes power and
lines of authority less visible. It is often difficult to know to whom to
make appeals, with whom to lodge complaints, or how to bring about
change. There are numerous cases in which an employee experiences
sexual harassment and wants to complain, yet loses because she did
not know to whom to report the offensive conduct or because she
reported to the wrong person.
3 7
These cases illustrate the more general proposition that when
there is no visible power structure, the invisible structures rule. In the
new workplace, these invisible power structures may well turn out to
be more remote and impenetrable for women and minorities than the
old power structures. Responsibility for discriminatory decisions has
become difficult to assign and even more difficult to remedy.
Furthermore, it is difficult to meet the legal test to establish liabil-
ity for discrimination in today's workplace. If a plaintiff alleges dis-
criminatory treatment, she must show that the employer treated her
in a disadvantageous way with a discriminatory intent.38 Proving the
employer's discriminatory intent is the most important, and most diffi-
cult, task of the plaintiff. However, the available techniques for dem-
onstrating an unlawful motive only make sense in a world in which
employers make employment decisions on the basis of uniform poli-
cies and practices that can be articulated. In such a world, if an em-
ployer departs from its uniform policy or pre-existing practices, then
36 Beth M. Mantz, Dow Jones News Wires, Johnson &Johnson Discrimination Suit
May Be One of Largest Ever, Nov. 16, 2001 (quoting the plaintiffs' complaint), available
at http://www.diversityatwork.com/news/dec01/Johnson.htm.
37 See, e.g., Watkins v. Prof'l Sec. Bureau, Ltd., No. 98-2555, 1999 WL 1032614
(4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999); Montero v. Agco Corp., 192 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 1999);
Schrean v. Chicago Transit Auth., No. 97 CV 3455, 1999 WL 977068 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22,
1999).
38 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805-06 (1973).
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the plaintiff can use that fact to show that the employer's proffered
reason is a pretext. When employers have uniform policies and prac-
tices, these policies establish a baseline against which an employer's
actions can be measured and a pretext can be identified. Indeed,
without evidence that an employer's practice is a departure from a
uniform baseline, it is practically impossible for a plaintiff to prove
that an employer's asserted motive is a pretext.
It is difficult for a plaintiff to prove that the employer acted with a
discriminatory intent in today's workplace. In the boundaryless work-
place, employment decisions are decentralized. Rather than promot-
ing uniform policies and centralized decisionmaking, many firms
today delegate job assignment decisions to disparate, decentralized
decisionmakers. Sometimes these decisionmakers are peers. In the
boundaryless workplace, decisionmakers are expected to exercise sub-
jective, often ad hocjudgments. In this setting, it is difficult to estab-
lish whether a particular decision is pretextual because there is no
uniform baseline from which the employer's deviation can be identi-
fied. The baseline is constantly changing.
In addition to the difficulties of identifying discrimination and
locating the responsible party in the face of decentralized and dis-
persed decisionmaking structures, the new workplace exacerbates the
problem of coworker discrimination. Today, discrimination often
takes the form of cliques, patronage networks, and buddy systems that
utilize tools such as ostracism and subtle forms of non-sexual harass-
ment (as well as sexual harassment) to exclude and disempower new-
comers. The harms caused can be devastating to the victim, yet not
cognizable under existing theories of discrimination. Existing theo-
ries of liability assume that the discriminator is in a hierarchical rela-
tionship to the complainant. Woman and minority plaintiffs who
complain of coworker harassment must prove that the employer knew
or should have known about the harassment and failed to take reme-
dial measures. The plaintiff has the burden of proof on both issues,
and the burden is formidable. If a worker fails to report coworker
harassment for fear of subtle and not-so-subtle retaliation, her failure
to report makes it easy for a firm to deny knowledge of the harassment
and thus escape liability. Some courts find that the employer is on
notice of harassment if other employees have reported similar inci-
dents, 39 but not all courts do so. Similarly, some courts will find that
39 See Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 118 (3d Cir. 1999) (find-
ing that reporting policies cannot increase a plaintiffs burden under the law); see also
B. Glenn George, If You're Not Part of the Solution, You're Part of the Problem: Employer
Liability for Sexual Harassment, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 153-54 (2001).
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an employer is not on notice of harassment if the employee complains
to the wrong supervisor.40
Finally, remedies become problematic in a world of flattened hi-
erarchies. Many types of discrimination involve failure to promote wo-
men and minorities along stable job ladders, and the remedies
include decrees to move them up to their "rightful" places. When
there are no such job ladders, it is difficult not only to identify dis-
crimination, but also to remedy it.
B. Framing New Procedures for New Types of Discrimination
In order to make further strides toward equality in the workplace,
it is necessary to devise new antidiscrimination theories and proce-
dures. At present, employment discrimination claims are brought to a
court or an administrative agency such as the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission or a state human rights agency. These tribu-
nals have the virtue of placing decisionmaking authority in the hands
of someone who is not part of the workplace that gave rise to the
alleged discrimination and who can apply neutral, nondiscriminatory
norms. However, both courts and agencies are also remote from the
workplace, circumscribed in the evidence they can hear, and limited
in the remedies they can issue. Furthermore, as Judith Resnik has
pointed out, courts and agencies have constricted approaches to legal
standing that prevent them from treating discrimination as the collec-
tive harm that it is. Rather, by requiring the individual targets of dis-
crimination to bring an action, courts cannot address the ways in
which a culture of harassment can arise that shapes power relation-
ships among all individuals in a workplace.
41
Furthermore, much of today's discrimination takes the form of
coworker conduct that marginalizes a member of an outsider group.
It is difficult to imagine a court imposing civil liability on a group of
workers for ganging up on a coworker or for spreading nefarious gos-
40 Compare Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1300 (11th Cir.
2000) (affirming summary judgment for the employer when the employee did not
report to the proper representative), withJackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 663
(6th Cir. 1999) (holding that harassing conduct need not be reported by the
plaintiff).
41 See Judith Resnik, The Rights of Remedies: Collective Accountings for and Insuring
Against the Harms of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 247
(Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004). Susan Sturm has also pointed
out that the activities that produce exclusion of women and blacks is highly contextu-
alized and not amenable to crisp, clear rules of right and wrong. See Susan Sturm,
Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
458, 475-78 (2001).
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sip unless the conduct constitutes a cognizable crime or tort, such as
assault or rape.
In addition, it is not always feasible for individuals to obtain re-
dress from a court or administrative agency. Courts and agencies are
inundated with complaints and have large backlogs. Litigation is ex-
pensive and many victims of employment discrimination lack the re-
sources to enforce their rights.
Even if the courts were not backlogged and litigation were inex-
pensive, there is an additional reason why new forms of discrimination
are not best handled in an adversary procedure. The adversary pro-
cess gives each side a stake in proving the truthfulness of its claims and
the falsity of the opposing party's claims, even when doing so inflicts
damage on a continuing relationship. Where complaints involve alle-
gations of exclusion, marginalization, or subtle forms of harassment,
the complaining party must either demonize her coworkers or risk
demonization herself. For example, if a plaintiff complains she has
been shunned and denied access to informal know-how, her cowork-
ers might defend by claiming that they refused to socialize with her
because they disliked her and found her to be obnoxious or even
paranoid. The complaining party then must counter by impugning
the motives and good faith of the dominant group, accusing them of
racism, sexism, or worse. That is, the courtroom setting tends to make
each side exaggerate its accusations and harden its position rather
than seek conciliatory solutions. In a harassment case, this kind of
name-calling occurs not as lunchroom gossip, but in the open of a
public trial. Even if the accusations are true-and they frequently
contain considerable truth-the public nature of the setting makes it
unlikely that such a dynamic will help a workplace to function better.
For all these reasons, conventional litigation is not always an ef-
fective option for remedying employment discrimination and it is nec-
essary to devise a dispute resolution procedure that can supplement
existing judicial mechanisms. Some employers have attempted to use
the dispute resolution mechanisms discussed earlier to address dis-
crimination claims. However, it is difficult to devise internal dispute
resolution systems that can help counteract the development of work-
place fiefdoms and cliques, redress abuses of hidden authority, and
bring external norms to the workplace.
Most ADR mechanisms are designed to apply norms internal to
the workplace to a situation of conflict and thus they cannot address
these second-generation forms of discrimination in a reliable and con-
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sistent fashion.42 Any procedure used to redress employment discrim-
ination must not delegate responsibility for recognizing and
remedying discriminatory conduct to the work group, because the
work group is often the source of the problem. Similarly, it cannot
delegate those tasks to top management, because top managers have
an interest in smooth operations, which often means condoning the
discriminatory conduct. Instead, it is necessary to devise a system of
workplace-specific alternative dispute resolution that utilizes neutral
outsiders to scrutinize workplace conduct, identify subtle as well as
overt discriminatory practices, bring external norms of equal opportu-
nity to bear, and fashion effective remedies. By bringing in outside
neutrals to adjudicate workplace disputes, such a system could offer
the possibility of injecting an external standard of fairness that can
transcend the rule of the clique.
Two types of alternative dispute resolution involve the use of
outside neutrals-mediation and arbitration. While mediation has
the virtue of resulting in a consensual resolution to a dispute, it is not
always possible to resolve discrimination claims in such a forum.
Mediators aspire to a stance of neutrality, yet neutrality compels them
to refrain from intervening to correct power disparities that might ex-
ist between the parties-disparities in resources, sophistication, knowl-
edge, or experience-that might compromise one side's ability to
negotiate a fair settdement of the dispute. In discrimination cases, the
complainant is by definition a member of a subordinate group, so that
disparities in power are almost always present. Thus, mediation usu-
ally is not appropriate for the types of discrimination cases described
here. Rather, there must be an outsider who is empowered to hear
claims and make an independent decision to resolve a dispute. That
means there has to be a system of arbitration.
C. The Uses and Abuses of Workplace Arbitration
The use of arbitration in the nonunion workplace has been grow-
ing at a fast pace. After the Gilmer decision in 1991, employers insti-
tuted arbitration systems in almost ten percent of nonunion
42 Susan Sturm gives examples of internal dispute resolution systems established
by Deloitte & Touche, Intel, and Home Depot to deal with complaints of subtle forms
of gender bias and exclusion that decreased women's advancement prospects. How-
ever, the success in each case depends upon a single individual in a position of au-
thority who is committed to advancing women's causes within the firm. Furthermore,
the case studies do not illustrate how a firm can use an internal dispute resolution
mechanism to bring about sustainable change. See Sturm, supra note 40.
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workplaces. 43 In part, the increase in workplace dispute resolution is
due to certain legal developments. Since the 1980s, there has been a
growth in employment litigation and employers have been found lia-
ble for unjust dismissal in some jurisdictions, employment discrimina-
tion in a variety of guises, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, invasion of privacy, slander, and other types of workplace
torts. In order to reduce their exposure, employers have tried to iden-
tify and resolve issues before they reach litigation proportions. The
Supreme Court decisions in Gilmer and Circuit City applying the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act (FAA) to employer-crafted arbitration procedures
in the nonunion setting enables employers to use arbitration as a
shield against liability or a method to mitigate awards. Under the
FAA, when there is a written arbitration clause in effect, courts must
stay litigation and compel arbitration instead. 44
Because most employment arbitration procedures are crafted by
employers, they are often drafted in ways that make it likely that an
employer will prevail in the arbitration proceeding. For example,
some place severe limits on discovery, limit the number of witnesses or
types of evidence an employee can present, shorten limitations peri-
ods, heighten burdens of proof, and restrict remedies that could be
recovered. 45 In addition, some are drafted in a way that imposes
asymmetrical obligations-requiring a worker but not the employer to
submit all disputes to arbitration. Some permit the employer to pick
the pool from which the arbitrator will be selected. Some require
workers to bear a substantial cost for bringing a case to arbitration.
Courts are divided as to whether such procedures can be enforced. 46
43 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); supra text
accompanying note 1.
44 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4 (2000).
45 See, e.g., Lang v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 835 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Minn. 1993)
(enforcing an arbitration agreement that had been sent by the employer to the em-
ployee by mail and to which the employee never consented); Pony Express Courier
Corp. v. Morris, 921 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. App. 1996) (rejecting an unconscionability
challenge to an arbitration system in which the employee had no discovery rights and
severely restricted remedies). See generally Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Ar-
bitration of Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REv.
1017, 1036-41 (1996).
46 Compare Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(holding asymmetrical arbitration clauses not unconscionable, but stating, in dicta,
that if an employee were required to pay arbitral fees to have her claim heard in
arbitration, a clause would be unconscionable), with Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Ran-
dolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (holding an arbitration clause that imposed steep costs on
a party seeking to vindicate statutory rights is not per se unconscionable), and Stirlen
v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that an asymmetrical
arbitration clause requiring the employee to arbitrate but not the employer and re-
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Initially courts upheld employer-crafted arbitration procedures
that contained serious due process deficiencies in their pro-arbitra-
tion zeal. 47 As a result, in the 1990s, many employers adopted policies
that compelled employees to bring their employment discrimination
complaints to arbitrators who were biased in favor of the employer or
who simply lacked knowledge of anti-discrimination law. Further,
under current interpretations of the FAA, arbitration awards receive
virtually no judicial review. 48 Decisions rendered by biased deci-
sionmakers or in unfair proceedings could not be appealed. 49
Gradually throughout the 1990s, courts began to disallow many
of these unfair procedures by ruling them unconscionable or unen-
forceable on due process grounds. For example, courts have held
that it is unconscionable to require an employee to pay excessive fees
to have her claims heard, 50 or that it is improper to require an em-
ployee to arbitrate claims when the employer is not similarly bound.51
One court held that an arbitral panel that was hand-picked by an em-
ployer was not a proper "arbitration" under the FAA.
52
Despite the potential abuses of employer-crafted arbitration sys-
tems in the past, it is possible to design a dispute resolution system
that could address the subtle but powerful forms of discrimination in
today's workplaces. This use of ADR would not merely provide proce-
dural justice but also be a method of implementing substantive public
policies. Such a system would seek to vindicate equality norms with-
out the limitations imposed by current Title VII doctrine. For exam-
stricting potential remedies an employee could recover is unconscionable and unen-
forceable). See also Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999),
where an arbitration system where the employer selected the panel from which the
arbitrators were chosen was held not to be unenforceable.
47 See Stone, supra note 44, at 1036-41.
48 Under the FAA, an arbitral award may not be vacated for an error of law or
erroneous fact-finding, but only if the arbitral award displayed a "manifest disregard"
of the law. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodri-
guez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). See generally Kathe-
rine V. W. Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act,
77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 954-55 (1999) (citing cases that establish the narrow standard of
review under the FAA).
49 For criticisms of employer-designed arbitration systems in the nonunion set-
ting, see Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and
Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1 (1996); David S. Schwartz,
Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age
of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33; Stone, supra note 48.
50 See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1488; see also Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 95 (holding that the
plaintiff failed to show sufficient likelihood of excessive costs).
51 Stirlen, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
52 Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999).
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pie, decisionmakers could take into account many kinds of evidence,
including shop history and lore, to identify departures from past prac-
tices and consider whether or not an employer's stated reasons for an
action were pretextual. Furthermore, claimants could impugn the
plausibility of an employer's asserted reason for taking an action that
disadvantaged a woman or minority employee by showing that the ac-
tion was irrational or inconsistent with sound business judgment-ar-
guments that, while comporting with common sense, are not
persuasive to a court in a Title VII case. In addition, workplace arbi-
tration could embrace disputes between coworkers as well as disputes
between employees and employers. While a court may not find a par-
ticular type of conduct sufficiently serious to be actionable under Title
VII, an arbitrator may be better attuned to the contextualized nature
of the harm done.
To ensure that arbitration can adequately identify and redress
subtle forms of employment discrimination that arise in the new work-
place, courts would have to impose minimal standards of due process
on the arbitration process.53 Thus, for example, a court would have to
ensure that the complainant had a right to counsel, to take discovery,
subpoena witnesses, obtain documents, and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses. The arbitration procedure could not unduly shorten limita-
tions periods, shift burdens of proof, or impose high costs on the
party seeking to vindicate her discrimination claim. Furthermore, an
outside arbitrator would not merely have to apply norms internal to
the workplace, but also serve as a check on the possibility of tyranny
and capture by insider cliques. That is, the arbitrator would have to
apply the external norms embodied in anti-discrimination law. Under
this proposal, there would have to be de novojudicial review for issues
of law to ensure that arbitrators did not merely defer to the rule of the
clique, but rather applied Title VII and other employment laws to the
workplace. In order to preserve the right of appeal, a record would
have to be made, and a written opinion rendered.
Workplace arbitration, as proposed herein, would cost more than
most current forms of nonunion arbitration because it requires a tran-
script, a reasonably full hearing, and a written opinion. However,
such a procedure offers employers a relatively expeditious factfinding
procedure that could stave off many lawsuits. Employment discrimi-
nation suits are often factually dense matters, so that when documen-
tary evidence and credibility assessments can be determined in an
53 See Stone, supra note 48, at 1024-28 (suggesting a mechanism to provide in-
creased scrutiny and to inject external norms into private arbitration tribunals).
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arbitral review setting, employers and employees can often be spared
lengthy and expensive litigation.
CONCLUSION
I have described two models of ADR in the changing workplace-
a procedural justice model and a public policy model. The first in-
volves using ADR to reinforce and apply existing workplace values.
The second involves using ADR to change the normative life of the
community and inject external notions of racial and gender justice.
Each model applies to different types of disputes, although it would
be easy to imagine a dispute that could be characterized as both. In
such a case it would be necessary to consider what to do with the over-
lap. For present purposes, however, the larger question is can the
models co-exist? Does building up one type of ADR system under-
mine the possibilities for the second? Obviously there is no barrier to
a company having more than one dispute resolution program, and
indeed many companies do just that. A recent book by David Lipsky,
Ron Seeber, and Richard Fincher shows that some companies have
dispute resolution systems that are so complex and multi-optioned
that their organizational diagrams look like maps of the Paris subway
system.54 But there is nonetheless an important respect in which an
internal norm-applying due process system might be incompatible
with an external norm-based public policy system. That is, there is a
danger that bolstering the internal self-regulatory aspects of the work-
place by means of dispute resolution aimed at enhancing procedural
justice could, in fact, intensify the cliquishness that makes the external
dispute resolution system necessary. Conversely, an ADR system with
external decisionmakers to impose external standards of conduct
could undermine the ability of dispute resolution to provide procedu-
ral justice and generate organizational citizenship behavior. The ten-
sion between the two uses of workplace ADR is an issue that will
require further research and discussion into the roles and functions of
dispute resolution in the new and changing workplace.
54 See DAVID B. LIPSKY ET AL., EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING WORKPLACE CON-
FLICT: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN CORPORATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION PROFESSIONALS 151 fig.4.3 (2003).
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